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Carrying On Like
a Madman: Insanity
and Responsibility in
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde
MELISSA J. GANZ

‘‘I

declare at least, before God, [that] no
man morally sane could have been
guilty of that crime upon so pitiful a provocation; and that
I struck in no more reasonable spirit than that in which a sick
child may break a plaything.’’1 Thus Henry Jekyll describes his
inexplicable murder of Sir Danvers Carew in the statement that
he leaves for his lawyer and friend, Gabriel Utterson, at the end
of Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
(1886). In the statement, Jekyll refuses to accept responsibility
for Carew’s death, insisting that he was in a ‘‘fit of . . . delirium’’
(Jekyll and Hyde, p. 64) throughout the attack and could not
control his actions. At the time, he explains, he had assumed
the identity of his ‘‘second and worse [self]’’ (p. 62), the savage
Nineteenth-Century Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 363–397, ISSN: 0891–9356, online ISSN:
1067–8352, © 2015 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through
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1
Robert Louis Stevenson, Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, in ‘‘The Strange Case of
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’’ and Other Tales of Terror, ed. Robert Mighall (New York: Penguin,
2002), p. 64. Further references to this edition appear in the text as Jekyll and Hyde.
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Edward Hyde. Although Jekyll’s argument appears blatantly selfserving, his attempt to exonerate himself finds support elsewhere in the text. Friends and acquaintances routinely comment
on his mental instability. In many ways, the novel invites us to
read Jekyll’s evil double as the manifestation of his madness.
The idea of exculpatory insanity sparked fierce debates
between jurists and doctors throughout the nineteenth century.
The cognitive test of insanity that emerged from the M’Naghten
case of 1843 deemed a person legally irresponsible for his acts
if, due to a defect of reason resulting from mental disease,
he was unable to perceive the nature and quality of his acts
or to know that they were wrong.2 Early psychiatrists—‘‘alienists,’’
as they were known—like James Cowles Prichard and Henry
Maudsley, however, argued that this test failed to acknowledge
the existence of affective and volitional disorders such as moral
and impulsive insanity. Prichard and Maudsley urged judges to
adopt a more permissive standard—an ‘‘irresistible impulse’’
test—that deemed accused criminals ‘‘mad’’ if they were unable
to control their actions, even if they knew what they were doing
was wrong. In the 1870s and 1880s, this position gained
ground, as scientists and social thinkers emphasized the role
that biology and environment played in shaping human behavior and people became more skeptical about the idea of free
will. The jurist and statutory draftsman James Fitzjames Stephen, in fact, reversed his opinion and joined Prichard and
Maudsley in arguing for a broader definition of insanity. Other
judges, though, vociferously opposed the idea on both moral
and practical grounds. In their view, the broader standard
threatened to undermine the goals of law enforcement by
permitting those who deserved punishment to go free.3 Published in the midst of this controversy, Jekyll and Hyde takes up
2

See Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), at 722.
For an overview of the debates, see Thomas Maeder, Crime and Madness: The Origins and Evolution of the Insanity Defense (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 36–51;
John R. Reed, Victorian Will (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 133–52; Roger
Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 38–56, 75–89, 96–123; Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing
the Criminal: Culture, Law, and Policy in England, 1830–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 166–71, 269–76; and Roger Smith, ‘‘The Boundary Between
Insanity and Criminal Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century England,’’ in Madhouses,
3
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questions concerning criminal responsibility that preoccupied
the Victorians and that continue to spark debate today.
Scholars have examined the novel’s portrait of criminality
as well as its engagement with developments in the mind
sciences, but they have paid little attention to the legal questions raised by Jekyll’s apparent madness.4 Mary Rosner and
Robert Mighall only briefly consider the issue of culpability.
After reviewing the medico-legal debates, Rosner simply asserts
that ‘‘Stevenson may have evoked [the] controversial diagnosis
[of moral insanity] in order to highlight and undercut’’ the
-

Mad-Doctors, and Madmen: The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era, ed. Andrew
Scull (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), pp. 363–84.
4
On Stevenson’s engagement with Victorian psychology, see Jill L. Matus, Shock,
Memory and the Unconscious in Victorian Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2009), pp. 160–82; Julia Reid, Robert Louis Stevenson, Science, and the ‘‘Fin de Sie`cle’’ (New
York: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 5–12, 92–105; Ann Stiles, Popular Fiction and Brain Science in
the Late Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 27–49; Jason
Daniel Tougaw, Strange Cases: The Medical Case History and the British Novel (New York:
Routledge, 2006), pp. 139–75; Ed Block, Jr., ‘‘James Sully, Evolutionist Psychology, and
Late Victorian Gothic Fiction,’’ Victorian Studies, 25 (1982), 443–67; Michael Davis,
‘‘Incongruous Compounds: Re-reading Jekyll and Hyde and Late-Victorian Psychology,’’
Journal of Victorian Culture, 11 (2006), 207–25; Richard Dury, ‘‘Crossing the Bounds of
Single Identity: Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and a Paper in a French Scientific Journal,’’ in
Robert Louis Stevenson, Writer of Boundaries, ed. Richard Ambrosini and Richard Dury
(Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 2006), pp. 237–51; Christine Persak, ‘‘Spencer’s
Doctrines and Mr. Hyde: Moral Evolution in Stevenson’s ‘Strange Case,’’’ Victorian
Newsletter, no. 86 (1994), 13–17; and Martin Tropp, ‘‘Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Schopenhauer, and the Power of the Will,’’ Midwest Quarterly, 32 (1991), 141–55. On the novel’s
treatment of crime, see Stephen Arata, Fictions of Loss in the Victorian Fin de Sie`cle (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 33–53; Simon Joyce, Capital Offenses: Geographies of Class and Crime in Victorian London (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press,
2003), pp. 145–78; Beth Kalikoff, Murder and Moral Decay in Victorian Popular Literature
(Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1986), pp. 166–68; Marie-Christine Leps, Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse (Durham, N.C.:
Duke Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 205–20; and Gordon Hirsch, ‘‘Frankenstein, Detective
Fiction, and Jekyll and Hyde,’’ in ‘‘Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’’ after One Hundred Years, ed.
William Veeder and Gordon Hirsch (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1988), pp.
223–46. Cathrine O. Frank and Scott Veitch read the novel in relation to developments
in civil as opposed to criminal law (see Frank, ‘‘Privacy, Character, and the Jurisdiction
of the Self: A ‘Story of the Door’ in The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,’’ English
Language Notes, 48 [2010], 215–24; and Veitch, ‘‘Binding Precedent: Robert Louis
Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde,’’ in Reading the Legal Case: CrossCurrents between Law and the Humanities, ed. Marco Wan [New York: Routledge, 2012],
pp. 217–30). Lisa Rodensky offers an insightful analysis of Victorian novels’ engagement
with criminal responsibility more generally (see Rodensky, The Crime in Mind: Criminal
Responsibility and the Victorian Novel [New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003]).
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distinction between the ‘‘sane’’ and the ‘‘insane,’’ the ‘‘bad’’ and
the ‘‘mad.’’5 Mighall similarly speculates that Jekyll ‘‘may very
well be leaving his confession to be read by his medical colleagues so that they can judge Hyde/Jekyll’s responsibility, and
perhaps allow him to escape the ‘scaffold.’’’6 Mighall observes
that Jekyll’s ‘‘diagnosis of Hyde as morally insane might very well
have been accepted [in the world outside the novel],’’ explaining that Jekyll ‘‘would have been incarcerated in a special prison
instead’’ (‘‘Diagnosing Jekyll,’’ p. 150).7 Rosner’s and Mighall’s
5
Mary Rosner, ‘‘‘A Total Subversion of Character’: Dr. Jekyll’s Moral Insanity,’’
Victorian Newsletter, no. 93 (1998), 30.
6
Robert Mighall, ‘‘Diagnosing Jekyll: The Scientific Context to Dr Jekyll’s Experiment and Mr Hyde’s Embodiment,’’ in ‘‘The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’’ and
Other Tales of Terror, p. 150.
7
In an earlier study, Mighall likewise notes the ways in which Stevenson draws upon
the ideas of alienists such as Maudsley, but he argues that Jekyll’s case ultimately ‘‘demands an epistemological model other than that provided by either medicine or law’’
(Robert Mighall, A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction: Mapping History’s Nightmares
[New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999], p. 188). The novel ‘‘evokes the practices and
expectations of clinical or legal procedure,’’ Mighall concludes, ‘‘only to deny them in
the interests of sensation or horror. . . . Whilst the case of Jekyll and Hyde touches on
both medical and legalistic matters and invokes their explanatory models, it is a horror
story, and therefore exceeds the epistemological limits of these discourses’’ (Geography,
p. 192). Simon Petch and Julia Reid note Stevenson’s evocation of Jekyll’s moral
insanity but they do not pursue the implications of this observation (see Petch, ‘‘The
Sovereign Self: Identity and Responsibility in Victorian England,’’ in Law and Literature,
ed. Michael Freeman and Andrew D. E. Lewis, vol. 2 of Current Legal Issues [New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1999], pp. 401–5; and Reid, Robert Louis Stevenson, pp. 96–97).
Simon Stern, too, observes that the novel can ‘‘usefully be approached . . . as a legal
case’’ (Stern, rev. of The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, ed. Martin A. Danahay, Law
and Politics Book Review, 18 [2008], 356). ‘‘One of the questions that Jekyll and Hyde can
be used to raise . . . ,’’ he suggests, ‘‘involves the difference between the M’Naghten
approach and an approach that focuses more generally on the defendant’s ability to
adhere to legal requirements’’ (p. 358). Edward W. Mitchell considers whether Jekyll
would be held responsible for causing his own disordered mental state according to
contemporary U.S. law. Mitchell’s analysis, however, proceeds from the assumption
that Jekyll does, in fact, suffer from mental disease; in Mitchell’s view, ‘‘a being [such
as Jekyll] would easily satisfy a volitional- or cognitive-style insanity test (particularly
because of an inability to distinguish right from wrong)’’ (Mitchell, ‘‘Culpability for
Inducing Mental States: The Insanity Defense of Dr. Jekyll,’’ Journal of the American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 32 [2004], 63). Nicola Lacey reads the novel as
showing the limits of both an older character-based notion of criminal responsibility
and a newer ‘‘capacity-based, internal or subjective’’ model of responsibility (Lacey,
‘‘Psychologising Jekyll, Demonising Hyde: The Strange Case of Criminal Responsibility,’’ Criminal Law and Philosophy, 4 [2010], 119). The ‘‘terror’’ of the novel, she argues,
‘‘resides in its questioning of whether either scientific knowledge or moral evaluation of
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assessments echo that of Stevenson’s friend John Addington
Symonds, who rebuked the novelist for depicting ‘‘a certain
moral callousness, a want of sympathy, a shutting out of hope.’’
‘‘Physical and biological Science on a hundred lines is reducing
individual freedom to zero, and weakening the sense of responsibility,’’ Symonds complained. ‘‘I doubt whether the artist
should lend his genius to this grim argument.’’8 In this view,
Stevenson exonerates Jekyll and affirms the idea of irresistible
impulse.
Stevenson’s treatment of criminal responsibility, however,
is more complicated than these critics suggest. In this essay,
I read the novel alongside the medico-legal debates swirling
through Victorian culture as well as Stevenson’s own brief but
formative career in the law. Although Stevenson promptly
abandoned work as an advocate to pursue a vocation as a writer,
he maintained a life-long interest in criminal justice and an
abiding faith in personal accountability. In Jekyll and Hyde,
I argue, Stevenson presents Jekyll’s case as one for jurists rather
than alienists. While the text appears to be sympathetic to the
position articulated by Maudsley and Stephen, it ultimately
shows the moral and practical dangers of broadening the definition of insanity. To recognize the idea of irresistible impulse
as the basis of an insanity defense, Stevenson shows, is to confound the distinctions between freedom and compulsion, deviance and disease. Stevenson’s frightening message is that the
wealthy and respected doctor is quite sane. The novel holds
Jekyll responsible for his actions and asks readers to do the
same.

Before we consider Jekyll’s case, we need to
review the controversy between jurists and alienists concerning
the nature and consequences of mental disease. Since the
-

character can provide a stable basis for attributions of responsibility’’ (‘‘Psychologising
Jekyll,’’ p. 111).
8
J. A. Symonds, letter to Robert Louis Stevenson, 3 March 1886, in The Letters of John
Addington Symonds, ed. Herbert M. Schueller and Robert L. Peters, 3 vols. (Detroit:
Wayne State Univ. Press, 1967–69), III, 120–21.
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thirteenth century, crimes in Anglo-American law have generally consisted of two elements: an unlawful act and a guilty
mind. If a suspect lacks the requisite mental state (mens rea),
he cannot be held responsible for committing the crime.9
Judges held early on that madmen lacked the ability to form
a criminal intent and, in the sixteenth century, they began
formulating definitions of insanity. The most influential test
to emerge was the ‘‘knowledge of good and evil’’ test, derived
from ancient Hebrew law. As the seventeenth-century jurist
Michael Dalton explained, ‘‘If one that is ‘non compos mentis,’
or an ideot, kill a man, this is no felony, for they have not knowledge of Good and Evil, nor can have a felonious intent, nor a will
or mind to do harm.’’10 This test was difficult to satisfy, as judges
held that any sign of rationality demonstrated the presence of
a conscience and the ability to discern right from wrong. To
qualify for exemption, the defendant needed to be ‘‘totally
deprived of his understanding and memory, and . . . not know
what he [was] doing, no more than an infant, . . . a brute, or a wild
beast.’’11
In a series of murder trials in the early 1840s, however, this
approach came under attack. In the first case, a jury acquitted
attempted regicide Edward Oxford after medical witnesses
diagnosed him as suffering from hereditary moral insanity; the
judge sent Oxford to Bethlem Asylum.12 In the second case,
a jury acquitted Daniel M’Naghten of murdering the Prime
9

See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (1765–69;
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979), IV, 20–21; and Joel Peter Eigen, Witnessing
Insanity: Madness and Mad-Doctors in the English Court (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,
1995), p. 35. For an overview of this doctrine in contemporary U.S. law, see Criminal
Law: Cases and Materials, ed. John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg, and Guyora Binder, 7th ed.
(New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2012), pp. 191–93.
10
Michael Dalton, The Country Justice (London, 1618), quoted in Maeder, Crime and
Madness, p. 7. On the ‘‘good and evil’’ test, see also Nigel Walker, Crime and Insanity in
England, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1968–73), I, 40–41.
11
Rex v. Arnold (1724), quoted in Maeder, Crime and Madness, pp. 10–11. See also
Daniel N. Robinson, Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: The Insanity Defense from Antiquity to the
Present (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 129–40. Despite this harsh
rule, Walker shows that the insanity defense was a regular feature of Old Bailey trials in
the second half of the eighteenth century (see Walker, Crime and Insanity, I, 57–72).
12
See Maeder, Crime and Madness, pp. 19–22; and Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, pp. 86–87.
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Minister’s private secretary after nine medical men testified
that M’Naghten was a victim of irresistible impulses. This verdict,
like the earlier one, produced widespread alarm, as the judge’s
instructions to the jury deviated from the traditional formulation.13 In response, the Queen summoned the fifteen common
law judges to appear before the House of Lords and asked them
to respond to a series of questions concerning the insanity
defense. Their answers, which became known as the ‘‘M’Naghten
Rules,’’ restated the knowledge of right and wrong test, rejecting
the broader formulations used in the Oxford and M’Naghten
trials. On behalf of fourteen judges, Lord Chief Justice Tindal
declared that ‘‘to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the
act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong.’’14 While not formally
binding on English courts, the rules established a clear principle
that judges used well into the twentieth century and that many
American jurisdictions continue to rely on today.15
13
See Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, pp. 86–87. In 1800, the Scottish defense
lawyer Thomas Erskine likewise challenged the traditional test when he argued for the
acquittal of attempted regicide James Hadfield on the ground that a mental delusion
had impelled Hadfield to discharge his pistol at the King. Erskine’s argument succeeded: the jury found Hadfield not guilty due to insanity and the judge sent him to
Bethlem Hospital (see Maeder, Crime and Madness, pp. 12–16). Shortly after the trial,
Parliament passed the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800, which created a special verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity; the law required those who were acquitted on such
grounds ‘‘to be kept in strict custody, in such place and in such manner as to the court
shall seem fit, until His Majesty’s pleasure be known’’ (quoted in Wiener, Reconstructing
the Criminal, p. 84). In 1883, Parliament changed the wording of the verdict to ‘‘guilty
but insane,’’ upsetting jurists by its finding of ‘‘both guilt and a lack of mens rea’’ (Smith,
Trial by Medicine, p. 18).
14
Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), at 722. For discussions of the
case, see Maeder, Crime and Madness, pp. 23–35; Robinson, Wild Beasts, pp. 163–76;
Smith, Trial by Medicine, pp. 14–16; Walker, Crime and Insanity, I, 84–103; and Wiener,
Reconstructing the Criminal, pp. 87–88. Anthony Platt and Bernard L. Diamond note that
in the early nineteenth century, judges began using the phrases ‘‘good and evil’’ and
‘‘right and wrong’’ interchangeably (see Platt and Diamond, ‘‘The Origins of the Right
and Wrong Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the
United States: An Historical Survey,’’ California Law Review, 54 [1966], 1237).
15
See Smith, Trial by Medicine, pp. 18–19; and Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal,
p. 88. In the United States, more than half of the states as well as the federal government
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The narrow formulation of this test, however, worried medical professionals who insisted that the law ought to reflect the
latest developments in mental science. Following the French
physician and founder of psychological medicine, Philippe
Pinel, alienists like Prichard in England and Isaac Ray in the
United States maintained that insanity could affect not only
cognitive or intellectual faculties but also the will and emotions.
In their view, the rational and affective functions of the brain
were located in different mental organs, and each one was
susceptible to disease. For this reason, a person could suffer
from ‘‘partial insanity,’’ meaning that the disease could come
and go and that it could be limited to certain mental faculties.16
In On the Different Forms of Insanity, in Relation to Jurisprudence
(1842), Prichard identified two types of disease affecting the
will and emotions: moral insanity and impulsive insanity. By
‘‘moral insanity’’ Prichard explained that he meant ‘‘a disorder
which affects only the feelings and affections, or what are
termed the moral powers of the mind, in contradistinction to
the powers of the understanding or intellect.’’17 The disease, he
noted, typically produced a profound alteration in the temper
and habits of a person such that an individual who was esteemed for ‘‘probity and high respectability’’ would suddenly
become ‘‘depraved, reckless, and devoid of all moral principle’’
(On the Different Forms, p. 59). Moral insanity overlapped with
-

use versions of the M’Naghten test. An additional seventeen states combine versions of the
M’Naghten test with versions of the volitional incapacity (i.e., irresistible impulse) test.
One state (New Hampshire) uses a broad ‘‘product-of-mental illness’’ test (see Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 [2006], at 749–51, reprinted in Criminal Law: Cases, Materials and
Problems, ed. Russell L. Weaver, et al., 3d ed. [St. Paul: West Publishing, 2009], p. 552).
On the history of the insanity defense in America, see Abraham S. Goldstein, The Insanity
Defense (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 67–96; Maeder, Crime and Madness, pp.
39–47, 58–97; and Robinson, Wild Beasts, pp. 176–208. For an overview of the different
tests used in American jurisdictions, see Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 6th
ed. (San Francisco: Matthew Bender, 2012), pp. 340–50.
16
See Eigen, Witnessing Insanity, pp. 76–81; Nicole Rafter, The Criminal Brain: Understanding Biological Theories of Crime (New York: New York Univ. Press, 2008), pp. 19–31;
and Smith, Trial by Medicine, pp. 16, 36–37.
17
James Cowles Prichard, On the Different Forms of Insanity, in Relation to Jurisprudence, Designed for the Use of Persons Concerned in Legal Questions Regarding Unsoundness of
Mind (London: Hippolyte Baillière, 1842), p. 19. See also Prichard, A Treatise on
Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind (London: Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper,
1835), pp. 12–26.
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the second ‘‘class of mental affections,’’ which, Prichard
acknowledged, was ‘‘very important in a legal point of view, and
of very difficult investigation’’:
These are distinguished in the following treatise, by the name of
Insane impulse, or Instinctive madness. The character of the
disease is a liability to sudden impulses to commit acts which
bespeak madness, or are not those of a sane person. Such acts
are often of an appalling and atrocious kind. . . . (p. 20)

As this definition reveals, Prichard found it impossible to describe
impulsive insanity without lapsing into tautology. He admitted
that it was ‘‘often very difficult to determine whether . . . persons
[liable to such impulses were] criminals or lunatics’’ (pp. 20–21).
Similarly, he conceded that ‘‘it is often very difficult to pronounce,
with certainty, as to the presence or absence of moral insanity,
or to determine whether the appearances which are supposed to
indicate its existence do not proceed from natural peculiarity or
eccentricity of character’’ (p. 31). But he insisted on the validity of
these diseases.18
Prichard’s disciple, Maudsley, also acknowledged the difficulty of diagnosing emotional insanity even as he insisted that
jurists recognize the disorder. The leading psychologist of the
1870s and editor of the Journal of Mental Science, Maudsley combined Prichard’s theories with the latest developments in evolutionist thought.19 In Body and Mind (1870), he emphasized
the connection between physical and mental life, arguing that
disordered minds stemmed from inherited defects in the brain.
Such defects manifested themselves on the body, he explained,
as those ‘‘persons who have a strong hereditary tendency to
insanity . . . often . . . [carry] in their physiognomy, bodily habit,
18

Ellen L. O’Brien reads Robert Browning’s dramatic monologues of the 1830s
and 1840s alongside Prichard’s account of insanity, arguing that the poems challenge
the distinctions Prichard draws between moral insanity and criminal malice. Her
analysis shows how Browning exposes the paradoxes of the medico-legal debates,
revealing ‘‘the simultaneity of madness and badness’’ (Ellen L. O’Brien, Crime in Verse:
The Poetics of Murder in the Victorian Era [Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 2008],
p. 126).
19
For an overview of Maudsley’s ideas, see Neil Davie, Tracing the Criminal: The Rise
of Scientific Criminology in Britain, 1860–1918 (Oxford: Bardwell Press, 2005), pp. 79–86;
and Rafter, Criminal Brain, pp. 102–5.
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and mental disposition the sure marks of their evil heritage.’’20
For Maudsley, there was little that one could do to resist such
a destiny. ‘‘In consequence of evil ancestral influences,’’ Maudsley observed, ‘‘[some] individuals are born with such a flaw or
warp of nature that all the care in the world will not prevent
them from being vicious or criminal, or becoming insane’’ (Body
and Mind, p. 75). ‘‘No one,’’ he insisted, ‘‘can escape the tyranny
of his organization; no one can elude the destiny that is innate in
him, and which unconsciously and irresistibly shapes his ends’’
(p. 75).
Maudsley developed these ideas in Responsibility in Mental
Disease (1874), devoting more than fifty pages to the disorders
that Prichard had identified. Maudsley noted that moral insanity
‘‘has so much the look of vice or crime that many persons regard
it as an unfounded medical invention.’’21 But, he insisted,
there is a disorder of mind in which, without illusion, delusion,
or hallucination, the symptoms are mainly exhibited in a perversion of those mental faculties which are usually called the active
and moral powers—the feelings, affections, propensities, temper, habits, and conduct. The affective life of the individual is
profoundly deranged, and his derangement shows itself in what
he feels, desires, and does. He has no capacity of true moral
feeling; all his impulses and desires, to which he yields without
check, are egoistic; his conduct appears to be governed by
immoral motives, which are cherished and obeyed without any
evident desire to resist them. There is an amazing moral insensibility. (Responsibility, pp. 171–72)

Like Prichard, Maudsley admitted that ‘‘it may be said that this
description is simply the description of a very wicked person,
and that to accept it as a description of insanity would be to
confound all distinction between vice or crime and madness’’
(p. 173). Indeed, he conceded, ‘‘so far as symptoms only are
concerned, they are much the same whether they are the result
20
Henry Maudsley, Body and Mind: An Inquiry into Their Connection and Mutual
Influence, Specially in Reference to Mental Disorders . . . (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1870), p. 61.
21
Henry Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease (New York: D. Appleton and Co.,
1874), pp. 170–71.
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of vice or of disease.’’ But, he insisted, ‘‘there is considerable
difference when we go on to inquire into the person’s previous
history—when we pass from psychological to medical observation’’ (p. 173). ‘‘In a person who has a distinct hereditary predisposition to insanity,’’ he explained, ‘‘there . . . [is] a marked
change of character; he becomes ‘much different from the man
he was’ in feelings, temper, habits, and conduct’’ (p. 174). ‘‘We
observe, in fact,’’ he continued, ‘‘that after a sufficient and wellrecognised cause of mental derangement—a combination of
predisposing and exciting causes which are daily producing
it—a person exhibits symptoms which are strangely inconsistent
with his previous character, but which are consistent with moral
insanity’’ (p. 174). Maudsley’s reasoning here is, of course, circular; much as Prichard had done, Maudsley ultimately cites the
symptoms of the disease as evidence of its existence. At the same
time, he suggests that medical professionals like himself are
uniquely qualified to diagnose the illness. Maudsley similarly
defended the idea of impulsive insanity from reproaches by
lawyers and writers. Critics of the disorder ‘‘have acted partly . . .
out of a natural jealousy of its abuse,’’ he charged, ‘‘but partly
also . . . out of bad philosophy’’ (p. 150); ‘‘its impulsive character
is of the very essence of insanity,’’ he claimed, ‘‘for in all forms of
the disease paroxysms of impulsive violence are common features’’ (p. 153).22
Given the existence of these disorders, Maudsley argued,
the ‘‘narrow and ill-founded . . . criterion of responsibility in
insanity’’ used by English courts resulted in gross injustice
(Responsibility, p. 108). The crucial question that judges ought
to ask in criminal cases, he explained, was whether or not the
accused was capable of controlling his actions. If a person’s
reason was intact but he could not use it because his feelings
or will were deranged, Maudsley insisted, the law ought to
acknowledge that person as insane.23 ‘‘How grossly unjust,’’
22

Maudsley considered moral and impulsive insanity to be the chief subdivisions of
‘‘Affective insanity—that is, Insanity without delusion, or Insanity of feeling and action’’
(Responsibility, p. 132). But he cautioned ‘‘against being supposed to propound [these
divisions] as a [definitive] classification of insanity,’’ noting that ‘‘insane impulses and
moral alienation are met with in various forms of mental disease’’ (p. 132n).
23
See Maudsley, Responsibility, pp. 105–11, 132–33.
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he declared, ‘‘[that] . . . the judicial criterion of responsibility . . .
dooms an insane person of this class to death if he knew what
he was doing when he committed a murder!’’ (Body and Mind,
p. 72). ‘‘There can be no doubt that in the capability of selfformation which each one has in greater or less degree,’’ Maudsley acknowledged, ‘‘there lies a power over himself to prevent
insanity’’ (Responsibility, p. 270). ‘‘A practical experience of the
insane,’’ he noted, ‘‘teaches us what a power of self-control even
they sometimes evince when they have a sufficient motive to
exert it’’ (pp. 270–71). But when, through a combination of
heredity and habit, individuals succumbed to disease, he maintained, they deserved mercy and care instead of blame and
punishment.24
Although Maudsley’s ideas received broad support from
fellow alienists, some medical professionals disagreed with his
views. The physiologist and London University Registrar William B. Carpenter, for one, advocated a different approach. In
Principles of Mental Physiology (1874), Carpenter acknowledged
the existence of moral and impulsive insanity but affirmed individuals’ ability to resist egoistic desires. ‘‘Whilst recognizing,
as a fact of observation, the large share which congenital Constitution and external influences have in the formation of those
tendencies of Thought and Feeling, which make up the Character of each individual,’’ he explained, ‘‘we must equally rely
on the assurance of our own Consciousness, that we have within
us a Power, which, if we use it aright, can in great measure
control the excesses and supplement the deficiencies of these
tendencies, and can direct them to good and useful instead of
24

Maudsley avoided suggesting that ‘‘persons suffering from moral insanity should
in every case be exempted from all responsibility for what they [did] wrong’’ (Responsibility, p. 181). In some cases, he conceded, the fear of punishment influenced such
individuals beneficially, and the actual infliction of punishment did some good.
‘‘Perhaps . . . the truest justice,’’ he concluded, ‘‘would be the admission of a modified
responsibility, the degree thereof, where it existed, being determined by the particular
circumstances of each case’’ (p. 181). In Body and Will (1883), he reiterated his wish
that, instead of seeking revenge on violent individuals exhibiting ‘‘an entire moral
insensibility,’’ jurists would show ‘‘pity for these defective beings suffering . . . under an
irremediably bad organisation’’ (Henry Maudsley, Body and Will: Being an Essay Concerning Will in Its Metaphysical, Physiological, and Pathological Aspects [New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1884], p. 279).
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evil and injurious ends.’’25 ‘‘The strength of this Power, which
we term Will,’’ Carpenter insisted, ‘‘mainly depends upon the
constancy with which it is exercised; the ascendancy of principles of
action determinately adopted by the Reason, over the strong
impulses of passion or desire, being only possible . . . when that
ascendancy has been habitually maintained’’ (Principles, p. 366).
He cautioned that, over time, repeated voluntary behaviors
would become automatic. ‘‘If a bad set of Habits have grownup with the growth of the individual, or if a single bad tendency
be allowed to become an habitual spring of action,’’ he explained, ‘‘a far stronger effort of Volition will be required to
determine the conduct in opposition to them’’ (pp. 350–51).
‘‘This is especially the case,’’ he continued, ‘‘when the habitual
idea possesses an Emotional character, and becomes the source
of desires’’ (p. 351). Unlike Prichard and Maudsley, Carpenter
maintained that individuals who yielded to such desires would be
fully responsible for their actions. ‘‘The nursemaid who cuts the
throat of a child to whom she is tenderly attached, because her
mistress has rebuked her for wearing too fine a bonnet,’’ he
observed, ‘‘may be really labouring under a ‘temporary insanity’
which drives her irresistibly to a great crime; yet, just as the man
who commits a murder in a state of drunken frenzy is responsible
for his irresponsibility . . . , so is the . . . murderess, in so far as she has
habitually neglected to control the wayward feelings whose
strong excitement has impelled her to the commission of her
crime’’ (p. 323; see also pp. 671–72). In order to prevent such
occurrences, Carpenter urged individuals to form good habits
early in life.26
25
William B. Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology, With Their Applications to the
Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of Its Morbid Conditions, 2d ed. (London:
Henry S. King and Co., 1875), p. 366. Hereafter this edition will be cited as Principles.
26
See Carpenter, Principles, pp. 245, 337–75. In the preface to the fourth edition of
his treatise, Carpenter reiterated this point: ‘‘a man (or woman) may come at last so far to
have lost the power of self-control, as to be unable to resist a temptation to what is known
to be wrong, and to be therefore morally irresponsible for the particular act,’’ Carpenter
explained; ‘‘but such an individual, like the drunkard in the commission of violence, is
responsible for his irresponsibility, because he has wilfully abnegated his power of self-control,
by habitually yielding to temptations which he knows that he ought to have resisted’’
(William B. Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology . . . , 4th ed. [New York: D. Appleton
and Co., 1883], p. xlv). For discussions of Carpenter’s ideas, see O’Brien, Crime in Verse,
p. 122; Reed, Victorian Will, pp. 143–44; and Smith, Trial by Medicine, pp. 50–51.
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Havelock Ellis, author of the first widely read scientific
study of criminality in England, largely agreed with this view.
‘‘Suppose we accept the definition of insanity which . . . is now
widely accepted by medical men . . . , that insanity is a loss of
self-control, the giving way to an irresistible impulse,’’ Ellis
explained in The Criminal (1890). ‘‘It cannot be unknown to
any one that self-control may be educated, that it may be weakened or strengthened by the circumstances of life. If we define
insanity as a loss of self-control and accept that as a ‘defence,’’’
he insisted, ‘‘we are directly encouraging every form of vice and
crime, because we are removing the strongest influence in the
formation of self-control.’’27 Ellis, who would later coauthor
a treatise on homosexuality with Stevenson’s friend Symonds,
seems to have shared some of Symonds’s anxieties about the
diminishing role of human agency in Victorian society. Rather
than excuse criminals for committing ‘‘irresistible’’ acts, Ellis
felt, courts ought to encourage would-be offenders to rein in
their passions.28
Not surprisingly, many jurists likewise objected to the idea
of irresistible impulse. Baron Bramwell, for one, argued that,
rather than excuse criminals, the appearance of an uncontrollable impulse warranted even stronger and more certain punishment. ‘‘The unhappy madman is a person who requires the
threat more than anybody else,’’ he explained, ‘‘because, from
the condition of his mind, he is more likely to have some temptation to commit the offence, and less intelligence to deter him
27
Havelock Ellis, The Criminal (London: Walter Scott, 1890), p. 291. Ellis’s position
is somewhat surprising, given the deterministic bent of his work. Like the Italian
criminologist Cesare Lombroso, whose ideas he popularized, Ellis argued for the
centrality of biology in the making of criminals. For discussions of Ellis’s and Lombroso’s ideas, see Davie, Tracing the Criminal, pp. 125–77; Rafter, Criminal Brain, pp.
65–88; and Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, pp. 235–40.
28
Although Ellis opposed the idea of irresistible impulse, he did not entirely
approve of jurists’ treatment of insanity. Objecting to the ‘‘divergent way in which
somewhat similar cases were [handled by the courts]’’ (The Criminal, p. 292), Ellis
proposed the addition of a commission of experts to decide points involving specialized knowledge or skill. He wanted the verdicts of the commission to be binding on
courts, ‘‘subject to an appeal to a supreme medico-legal tribunal’’ (p. 294). On Ellis’s
collaboration with Symonds, see Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. ‘‘Ellis,
(Henry) Havelock,’’ accessed 28 May 2013, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.libus.csd.
mu.edu/view/article/33009>.
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from doing it.’’29 Like Carpenter and Ellis, Bramwell felt that
many so-called ‘‘irresistible’’ impulses were actually resistible and
that the law needed to teach individuals to bring those desires
under control.30 Other jurists mockingly proposed a ‘‘policeman
at the elbow’’ test, according to which an impulse would be
deemed truly irresistible if the defendant could not suppress it
even when a policeman was by his side.31
In the last quarter of the century, as scientists and philosophers increasingly acknowledged the role of heredity and environment in shaping human behavior, alienists’ arguments gained
ground. The influential judge and statutory draftsman James
Fitzjames Stephen, in fact, reversed his position on this question.
In 1855, he read a paper to the Juridical Society, affirming the
M’Naghten Rules and rejecting the irresistible impulse test. Like
Bramwell, he expressed concerns that the distinction between
‘‘irresistible’’ impulses and unresisted impulses could be easily
confounded.32 Eight years later, in A General View of the Criminal
Law of England (1863), however, Stephen acknowledged that
defects of will might be relevant to the criterion set out in
M’Naghten.33 And in the 1870s, he drafted a Homicide Law
Amendment Bill and a Criminal Code that incorporated the
broader standard. 34 ‘‘The proposition . . . which I have to
29
Bramwell, B., in Report of the Capital Punishment Commission, P.P., vol. XXI (1866),
minute 152, quoted in Smith, Trial by Medicine, p. 74. See also Wiener, Reconstructing the
Criminal, pp. 88–89.
30
Bramwell went farther than most judges did. He argued that he would ‘‘control
[impulses] by the fear of hanging, mad or not mad’’ (Special Report from the Select Committee on Homicide Law Amendment Bill, P.P., vol. IX [1874], 27, quoted in Smith, Trial by
Medicine, p. 105).
31
See Maeder, Crime and Madness, p. 49.
32
See James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘‘On the Policy of Maintaining the Limits at Present
Imposed by Law on the Criminal Responsibility of Madmen,’’ in Papers Read before the
Juridical Society: 1855–1858, 4 vols. (London: V. and R. Stevens and G. S. Norton, 1858),
I, 67–94.
33
See James Fitzjames Stephen, A General View of the Criminal Law of England
(London: Macmillan, 1863), p. 95; and Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 273.
34
See Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 273. Other European legal codes also
incorporated the idea of irresistible impulse. The newly unified German nation, for
example, adopted a criminal code in 1871 that was influenced by French law. It provided that there was ‘‘no punishable act, if, at the time of doing it, the actor was in
a state of unconsciousness or of morbid disturbance of the mental faculties which
excluded the free determination of his will’’ (German Penal Code, par. 51, quoted in
Smith, Trial by Medicine, pp. 80–81).
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maintain and explain,’’ Stephen avowed in A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883), ‘‘is that, if it is not, it ought to be the
law of England that no act is a crime if the person who does it is
at the time when it is done prevented either by defective mental
power or by any disease affecting his mind from controlling
his own conduct, unless the absence of the power of control
has been produced by his own default.’’35 In Stephen’s view,
‘‘knowledge and power [were] the constituent elements of
all voluntary action, and if either [was] seriously impaired the
other [was] disabled’’ (History, II, 171).36 He proposed the
broader formulation in an attempt to make this idea explicit.
Other judges and lawmakers remained skeptical. Not surprisingly, the Royal Commission on Indictable Offenses rejected
his model code.37
While the M’Naghten test remained the legal standard, however, juries began to interpret and apply the rule in more flexible
ways. Defendants from the professional classes, in particular,
routinely invoked the idea of irresistible impulse, and juries
increasingly acquitted individuals on this ground.38 As The Times
complained in 1882, the idea seemed to be that ‘‘there [had to]
be something wrong in a man’s mental organization before he
could . . . [commit] a certain crime in certain circumstances.’’39
35
James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 3 vols. (London:
Macmillan and Co., 1883), II, 168. As the caveat in his test suggests, he remained
concerned about cases in which individuals caused their own loss of control. ‘‘I should
be sorry to countenance the notion that the mere fact that an insane impulse is not
resisted is to be taken as proof that it is irresistible,’’ he explained (History, II, 172).
36
In Stephen’s view, the definition of insanity set forth in the M’Naghten Rules
incorporated the idea of irresistible impulse. ‘‘It is as true,’’ he insisted, ‘‘that a man who
cannot control himself does not know the nature of his acts as that a man who does not
know the nature of his acts is incapable of self-control’’ (History, II, 171). In cases over
which Stephen presided, he encouraged jurors to construe the M’Naghten test in this
light (see John Hostettler, Politics and Law in the Life of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen [Chicester, England: Barry Rose, 1995], p. 71).
37
The commission concluded that the ‘‘test proposed for distinguishing between . . .
[an irresistible impulse] and a criminal motive, the offspring of revenge, hatred, or
ungoverned passion, appears to us on the whole not to be practicable or safe, and we are
unable to suggest one which would satisfy these requisites and obviate the risk of a jury
being misled by considerations of so metaphysical a character’’ (Report of the Royal Commission on Indictable Offences 1878–79, P. P. vol. XX [1878–79], 18, quoted in Wiener,
Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 274).
38
See Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 275.
39
Times, 12 April 1882, quoted in Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 275.
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Alienists like Maudsley celebrated these acquittals, but jurists
and laypeople worried about the ways in which such verdicts
muddied the distinctions between freedom and compulsion,
deviance and disease. The scope of the insanity defense and the
implications of brain science for criminal responsibility continue
to spark heated debates to this day.40

Stevenson began studying law at Edinburgh
University in 1871 primarily to placate his father. He wished to
pursue a literary career, but his father permitted him to give up
40
Robert M. Sapolsky, for example, argues that contemporary neurobiology ‘‘argues against the retrenchment back towards a sole reliance on M’Naghten that has gone
on in recent decades’’ (Sapolsky, ‘‘The Frontal Cortext and the Criminal Justice System,’’ in Law and the Brain, ed. Semir Zeki and Oliver Goodenough [New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 2006], p. 239). In particular, he contends, research on individuals with
impairments to the prefrontal cortext—an area of the brain that plays a key role in
cognition as well as emotional regulation and impulse control—supports a test of
exculpatory insanity that includes impaired volition. ‘‘It is possible to know the difference between right and wrong,’’ he maintains, ‘‘but, for reasons of organic impairment, to not be able to do the right thing’’ (‘‘Frontal Cortex,’’ p. 239). In The Anatomy of
Violence: The Biological Roots of Crime (New York: Vintage, 2013), Adrian Raine exhaustively documents the biological basis of criminal behavior even as he acknowledges the
human desire to seek retribution for such acts. He ultimately argues for a compromise
position, suggesting that we use our knowledge of the neural basis of crime to prevent
more violence (see Anatomy of Violence, pp. 329–40, 366–73). To do that, he maintains,
we need to adopt a ‘‘clinical perspective’’: we need to think of violence as a ‘‘disease that
affects our society’’ and show more compassion and less retribution toward offenders
(pp. 335, 336). Michael S. Gazzaniga, by contrast, argues that developments in neuroscience should not change legal conceptions of free will and individual responsibility.
Responsibility, in his view, is best understood as ‘‘an interaction between people, a social
contract’’ rather than a ‘‘property of the brain’’ (Gazzaniga, Who’s in Charge? Free Will
and the Science of the Brain [New York: HarperCollins, 2011], pp. 193, 215). ‘‘Responsibility reflects a rule that emerges out of one or more agents interacting in a social
context,’’ he argues, ‘‘and the hope that we share is that each person will follow certain
rules. An abnormal brain does not mean that the person cannot follow rules’’ (Who’s in
Charge? p. 193; see also Gazzaniga, ‘‘My Brain Made Me Do It,’’ in Defining Right and
Wrong in Brain Science: Essential Readings in Neuroethics, ed. Walter Glannon [New York:
Dana Press, 2007], pp. 183–94). Stephen J. Morse likewise rejects the idea that neuroscientific determinism undermines the legitimacy of criminal law (see Morse, ‘‘Lost
in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience,’’ in Law and Neuroscience, ed.
Michael Freeman, vol. 13 of Current Legal Issues [New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2011], pp. 543–54). Walter Glannon underscores the limitations of brain imagining
scans in assessing legal responsibility (see Glannon, ‘‘What Neuroscience Can [and
Cannot] Tell Us about Criminal Responsibility,’’ in Law and Neuroscience, pp. 13–28).
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engineering only if he took up law.41 The aspiring writer found
his legal training to be tedious. ‘‘Scots Law . . . is a burthen
greater than I can bear,’’ Stevenson complained to a friend in
November 1872.42 In July 1875, less than two weeks after passing
the bar examination and just three days after writing his first
brief as a lawyer, he left for the Continent; for the next few
months, he resided in an artists’ colony in France, where he
devoted himself to fifteenth-century French poetry.43
Yet, in spite of his well-known objections to the study and
practice of law, Stevenson showed an abiding interest in criminal justice. At his death, he owned more than twenty-eight
volumes of trial reports, including George Borrow’s Celebrated
Trials, and Remarkable Cases of Criminal Jurisprudence (1825) and
three volumes of the Old Bailey Sessions Papers.44 He consulted
his collection even after he went abroad. In October 1881, for
example, Stevenson asked his father to send him several books
from his library, including Hugo Arnot’s A Collection and Abridgement of Celebrated Criminal Trials in Scotland (1785) and John Hill
Burton’s Narratives from Criminal Trials in Scotland (1852), so that
he could write an article about a 1752 murder case.45 Also in
41
See David Daiches, Robert Louis Stevenson and His World (London: Thames and
Hudson, 1973), p. 26; and The Letters of Robert Louis Stevenson, ed. Bradford A. Booth
and Ernest Mehew, 8 vols. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1994–95), I, 209. Hereafter
this edition will be cited as Letters.
42
Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to James Walter Ferrier, 23 November 1872, in
Letters, I, 258.
43
Stevenson passed his final examination for the Scottish Bar on 14 July 1875 and
wrote his first brief on 23 July (see J. R. Hammond, A Robert Louis Stevenson Chronology
[New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997], p. 17; and Letters, II, 153). That fall, he returned to
Scotland and attempted to work as an advocate, but after a few months, he abandoned
the effort and devoted himself to his chosen profession of letters (Letters, II, 153).
44
Stevenson owned at least 17 volumes of collected trials and 11 volumes of individual trial reports (see Stevenson’s Library Database, The New Edinburgh Edition of
the Collected Works of Robert Louis Stevenson, accessed 1 June 2014 <https://
spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key¼ppfchUIR5vJFJKjS8rKqIWA&output¼html>).
45
See Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to Thomas Stevenson, Early November 1881,
in Letters, III, 246. On Stevenson’s use of the case in Kidnapped (1886), see Letters, III,
246, n. 1. In letters to his friend Charles Baxter, Stevenson would later request copies of
the Old Bailey Session Papers as well as Robert Pitcairn’s Ancient Criminal Trials in Scotland
(1883) and Sir John Lauder of Fountainhall’s Decisions (1759–61) (see Robert Louis
Stevenson, letter to Charles Baxter, 19 May 1891, in Letters, VII, 128; and Robert Louis
Stevenson, letter to Charles Baxter, 16 April 1893, in Letters, VIII, 53). According to
J. P. Mahaffy, Stevenson kept a copy of Lives of the Most Remarkable Criminals Who Have
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1881, he began collaborating with Edmund Gosse on a series of
papers recounting famous murder trials for the Century Magazine.46 In addition to reading and writing about true crime, Stevenson enjoyed William Harrison Ainsworth’s Newgate novels
and Wilkie Collins’s sensation and detective fiction.47 He likewise esteemed Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment (1866),
which, he told Symonds in the spring of 1886, was ‘‘the greatest
book [he had] read easily in ten years.’’48
Not surprisingly, Stevenson’s interest in criminal justice
found its way into his own fiction. In stories such as ‘‘The Suicide Club’’ (1882), ‘‘Markheim’’ (1885), and ‘‘Olalla’’ (1885),
Stevenson probes the workings of the deviant mind, contributing to the popular taste for tales of illicit behavior.49 In Jekyll and
-

Been Condemned and Executed for Murder, Highway Robberies, . . . or other Offences (1874) in
a small bookcase over the head of his bed, along with his copy of Shakespeare (see
Stevenson’s Library Database).
46
See Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to Edmund Gosse, 26 December 1881, in
Letters, III, 271. Gosse and Stevenson were still thinking about the series in March of the
following year, though they did not end up going through with the plan (see Robert
Louis Stevenson, letter to Edmund Gosse, 28 March 1882, in Letters, III, 307). On
Stevenson’s and Gosse’s arrangement with R. W. Gilder of the Century Magazine, see The
Letters of Robert Louis Stevenson, ed. Sidney Colvin, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1911), II, 75, 88–89. Earlier in 1881, Stevenson applied for the position of Chair of
History and Constitutional Law at Edinburgh (see Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to
Sidney Colvin, c. 24 June 1881, in Letters, III, 196–97). Stevenson did not obtain the
position, which he sought chiefly for the sake of a steady income; he viewed his application as the ‘‘crown’’ of a ‘‘career of imposition’’ (Stevenson, letter to Alexander Whyte,
Late October 1881, in Letters, III, 242; see also Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to Thomas
Stevenson, Early November 1881, in Letters, III, 246, n. 4).
47
On Ainsworth’s fiction, see Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to Edmund Gosse, 9
November 1881, in Letters, III, 248. On Collins’s novels, see Robert Louis Stevenson,
letter to Margaret Stevenson, 8 September 1868, in Letters, I, 144–45; and Robert Louis
Stevenson, letter to W. E. Henley, 17 or 18 July 1883, in Letters, IV, 143.
48
Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to John Addington Symonds, Early March 1886,
in Letters, V, 220. On Stevenson’s reaction to the novel, see also Robert Louis Stevenson,
letter to W. E. Henley, Early November 1885, in Letters, V, 151.
49
Stevenson examines issues of criminality, too, in Deacon Brodie, or the Double Life
(1880), which he cowrote with William Ernest Henley, and in The Hanging Judge
(1887), which he cowrote with his wife, Fanny. Deacon Brodie focuses on an eighteenthcentury Scottish town councilor who leads a secret life of crime; The Hanging Judge
examines the hypocrisy of another legal official—the eponymous jurist—who has
a secret, criminal past (see Stevenson, Deacon Brodie, or the Double Life, in Plays, vol. 9
of The Works of Robert Louis Stevenson, South Seas ed. [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1925], pp. 1–84; and Stevenson, The Hanging Judge, in Plays, pp. 231–303). On Stevenson’s contributions to—and anxieties about—the popular appetite for sensational
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Hyde, however, he takes up new questions about criminality,
intervening in the debates about insanity that preoccupied jurists, alienists, and social observers. Stevenson would have been
well aware of the controversy, for his essays and reviews of the
1870s and early 1880s appeared in journals such as The Spectator, The Academy, and The Fortnightly Review, which featured articles by Maudsley and Carpenter as well as discussions about
their work.50 As Ed Block, Jr. has shown, Stevenson’s friendship
-

literature, see Patrick Brantlinger, The Reading Lesson: The Threat of Mass Literacy in
Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Univ. Press,
1998), pp. 166–81.
50
The 18 July 1874 issue of The Spectator, for example, included a review of Carpenter’s Principles of Mental Physiology, and the 5 December 1874 issue included
a debate about free will to which Carpenter contributed (see ‘‘Dr. Carpenter’s Mental
Physiology,’’ Spectator, 18 July 1874, pp. 917–18; and William B. Carpenter, ‘‘To the
Editor of the ‘Spectator,’’’ Spectator, 5 December 1874, p. 1530). In August 1879, the
journal included an article responding to Maudsley’s materialism; in November 1879,
it published a review of Maudsley’s Pathology of Mind; and in July 1883, the journal
included a review of his Body and Will (see ‘‘Materialism, and its Lessons,’’ Spectator, 9
August 1879, pp. 1006–7; ‘‘Dr. Maudsley’s Pathology of Mind,’’ Spectator, 22 November
1879, pp. 1481–83; and ‘‘Dr. Maudsley on Body and Will,’’ Spectator, 28 July 1883, pp.
964–65). Reviews of Stevenson’s Edinburgh: Picturesque Notes and Travels with a Donkey in
the Cévennes meanwhile appeared in December 1878 and September 1879; a review of
Virginibus Puerisque appeared in June 1881; and a review of New Arabian Nights appeared
in November 1882 (see ‘‘Current Literature,’’ Spectator, 21 December 1878, p. 1607;
[Anon.], rev. of Travels with a Donkey in the Cévennes, by Robert Louis Stevenson, Spectator, 27 September 1879, pp. 1224–25; ‘‘Life at Twenty-Five,’’ Spectator, 11 June 1881,
pp. 775–76; and ‘‘Mr. Stevenson’s Stories,’’ Spectator, 11 November 1882, pp. 1450–52).
Stevenson seems to have read the journal on a fairly regular basis; in addition to the
8 August 1874 issue, he owned two issues from August 1876 and one each from May
and September 1879 (see Stevenson’s Library Database). The Academy likewise featured
discussions of mental physiology as well as writing by Stevenson. A review of Maudsley’s
Responsibility in Mental Disease appeared in the April 1874 issue of the journal (see C.
Lockhart Robertson, rev. of Responsibility in Mental Disease, by Henry Maudsley, Academy,
18 April 1874, pp. 434–35). That same year, Stevenson began contributing his own
reviews to the publication; his piece on Edgar Allan Poe appeared the following January
(see Stevenson, rev. of The Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vols. I and II, edited by John H.
Ingram, Academy, 2 January 1875, pp. 1–2). Articles by Maudsley also appeared in The
Fortnightly Review in the late 1870s; one of these pieces nearly overlapped with Grant
Allen’s review of Stevenson’s Travels with a Donkey in the Cévennes (see Maudsley, ‘‘Hallucinations of the Senses,’’ Fortnightly Review, 24 [1878], 370–86; Maudsley, ‘‘Materialism and its Lessons,’’ Fortnightly Review, 26 [1879], 244–60; and Grant Allen, ‘‘Some
New Books,’’ Fortnightly Review, 26 [1879], 153–54). Stevenson’s essay ‘‘The Morality of
the Profession of Letters’’ appeared in the journal in January 1881 (‘‘The Morality of
the Profession of Letters,’’ Fortnightly Review, 29 [1881], 513–20). Stevenson may also
have seen a review of Carpenter’s Principles of Mental Physiology and Maudsley’s Physiology
of Mind in the January 1879 issue of The Edinburgh Review, as he mentions reading an

dr. jekyll and mr. hyde

383

with the psychologist James Sully likewise exposed him to the
work of evolutionist thinkers such as Maudsley.51 (Sully was
a frequent visitor at Skerryvore during the period in which
Stevenson wrote Jekyll and Hyde.)52 Stevenson may, in fact, have
read Sully’s essay ‘‘Genius and Insanity,’’ which appeared in
Popular Science Monthly in August 1885; Sully discusses the idea
of moral insanity and cites Maudsley’s Responsibility in Mental
Disease in this piece.53 Stevenson also owned a copy of Charles
Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
(1872), which references Maudsley’s account of the ‘‘reappearance of primitive instincts’’ in the degenerated brains of insane
patients.54 Stevenson may have encountered Carpenter’s ideas at
Edinburgh, moreover, for the University granted the physiologist an honorary Doctor of Civil Law in 1871, when Stevenson
was a student there.55 In early 1875, less than a year after the
publication of Maudsley’s and Carpenter’s treatises on mental
physiology, Stevenson signaled his interest in disordered mental
-

article in the journal by his friend Sidney Colvin later that year (see ‘‘Mental Physiology,’’ Edinburgh Review, 1 January 1879, pp. 58–83; and Robert Louis Stevenson, letter
to Sidney Colvin, 28 July 1879, in Letters, II, 330–31).
51
See Block, ‘‘James Sully,’’ pp. 443–52. Beginning about 1876, Sully and Stevenson were both members of the Savile Club, and their work overlapped in the Cornhill
Magazine between 1876 and 1882 (Block, ‘‘James Sully,’’ pp. 446–47). Sully’s essays in
the journal provided ‘‘popularized evolutionist explanations of duality, primitive consciousness, illusions, and madness’’ (p. 447). In his autobiography, Sully emphasized
the mutual influence that he and Stevenson had on each other (p. 446).
52
See Block, ‘‘James Sully,’’ p. 446.
53
See Sully, ‘‘Genius and Insanity,’’ Popular Science Monthly, 27 (1885), 450, 454,
461. The essay first appeared in Nineteenth Century, 10 (1881), 573–87.
54
Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, ed. Paul Ekman, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), p. 241; for Maudsley’s account, see
Body and Mind, pp. 52–53. On Stevenson’s reaction to Darwin’s treatise, see Robert
Louis Stevenson, letter to Frances Sitwell, 1 September 1873, in Letters, I, 287. As
Stevenson owned a copy of Prichard’s The Natural History of Man, 3d ed. (London:
Hippoltye Baillière, 1848), he would also have been familiar with some of Prichard’s
ideas (see Stevenson’s Library Database).
55
See E. Ray Lankester, ‘‘Obituary: William Benjamin Carpenter,’’ Academy, 21
November 1885, p. 344. Stevenson would also have encountered a reference to Carpenter’s ideas in The Moonstone—which he read in September 1868—as the doctor’s
assistant, Ezra Jennings, cites Carpenter’s account of the ‘‘perceptive consciousness’’
when he explains his plan to induce Franklin Blake to steal the eponymous diamond
a second time (see Wilkie Collins, The Moonstone, ed. John Sutherland [New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1999], pp. 385–86; and Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to Margaret
Stevenson, 8 September 1868, in Letters, I, 144–45).
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states. In a review of Edgar Allan Poe’s collected tales, he praised
the writer’s ‘‘almost incredible insight into the debateable region
between sanity and madness’’ (Stevenson, rev. of The Works of
Edgar Allan Poe, p. 1).56
In Jekyll and Hyde, Stevenson offers his own analysis of the
nature and scope of insanity and its implications for criminal
law. Drawing upon while moving beyond the process of legal
justice, Stevenson imaginatively places the doctor on trial.57
Jekyll seems to be the prototype of the respectable, professional
man who succumbs to bouts of madness. The disease does not
affect his cognitive faculties; he is well aware of the difference
between right and wrong. When he first gives way to his illicit
desires, Jekyll confesses to being ‘‘conscious of a heady recklessness’’: ‘‘I knew myself, at the first breath of this new life,’’ he
explains, ‘‘to be more wicked, tenfold more wicked, sold a slave
to my original evil’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, p. 57). The fact that Jekyll
flees after killing Carew also suggests that he knows he has done
wrong, at least according to positive law. Upon assuming the
identity of his ‘‘better self’’ (p. 62), he is filled with shame and
‘‘remorse’’ (p. 64) for Hyde’s actions. Thus, by his own testimony, Jekyll would be found legally sane and fully responsible
for Carew’s death under the M’Naghten test.

56
Stevenson mentions, in particular, stories such as ‘‘The Tell-Tale Heart’’ and
‘‘The Imp of the Perverse,’’ which—as John Cleman astutely argues—hold the idea
of irresistible impulse up to critique (see Cleman, ‘‘Irresistible Impulses: Edgar Allan
Poe and the Insanity Defense,’’ American Literature, 63 [1991], 623–40). Stevenson
would have encountered the ‘‘right and wrong’’ test of insanity during his legal studies,
as Scottish courts adopted a cognitive test that was identical to M’Naghten (see John
H. A. MacDonald, A Practical Treatise of the Criminal Law of Scotland [Edinburgh: William
Paterson, 1867], pp. 14–16). Stevenson had long been attuned to questions of free will
and responsibility, as he was raised in a rigidly Calvinist family. During his early childhood, his father and his nurse, Alison Cunningham, instilled in him a heightened
awareness of sin. In his late teens, however, Stevenson rejected his parents’ Christian
beliefs and, in January 1873, he announced to his father that he was an atheist (see
Jenni Calder, Robert Louis Stevenson: A Life Study [New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980],
pp. 32–34; William Gray, Robert Louis Stevenson: A Literary Life [New York: Palgrave,
2004], pp. 3–4; and Robert Louis Stevenson, letter to Charles Baxter, 2 February
1873, in Letters, I, 273–74).
57
On the centrality of the law courts to Victorian fiction and the role of novels as
forums for moral and legal judgment, see Jonathan H. Grossman, The Art of Alibi:
English Law Courts and the Novel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2002).
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As we have seen, however, in the statement that he prepares
for Utterson, Jekyll suggests that he suffers from moral and
impulsive insanity. Lacing his ‘‘confession’’ with the language
of disease, he describes his first experiment with vice as an attack
of ‘‘a great sickness’’: he experiences ‘‘racking pangs’’ and ‘‘a
grinding in the bones, deadly nausea, and a horror of the spirit
that cannot be exceeded at the hour of birth or death’’ (Jekyll and
Hyde, pp. 56, 57). Later on, he observes that ‘‘the powers of Hyde
seemed to have grown with the sickliness of Jekyll’’ (pp. 68–69).
At the end of his statement, he describes his desperate efforts to
obtain a certain ‘‘drug’’—a ‘‘medicine’’—that would heal his
psychic division (p. 68). Coming from a man who possesses not
only a Doctor of Medicine but also a Doctor of Civil Law and
a Doctor of Laws, his statements are hardly surprising. Jekyll is in
a position to know the latest developments in medical jurisprudence and to craft the strongest possible case in his defense.58
But his friends and acquaintances likewise suggest that he suffers
from mental disease. The young woman who witnesses Carew’s
murder describes Hyde as ‘‘carrying on . . . like a madman’’ (Jekyll
and Hyde, p. 21). When Utterson’s clerk hears of the incident, he,
too, promptly declares that ‘‘the man, of course, was mad’’ (p. 29).
Upon learning of Jekyll’s strange testamentary disposition and
inexplicable association with Hyde, even the skeptical lawyer
Utterson denounces his friend’s ‘‘mad will’’ (p. 33). Utterson feels
that ‘‘so great and unprepared a change’’ in Jekyll ‘‘point[s] to
madness,’’ though he believes that ‘‘there must lie for it some
deeper ground’’ (p. 33). Dr. Lanyon, for his part, explains that,
more than ten years earlier, Jekyll ‘‘began to go wrong, wrong in
[his] mind’’ (p. 12). After he receives a letter from Jekyll, asking
58
Jekyll’s credentials are noted in his will; the document refers to ‘‘Henry Jekyll,
MD, DCL, LLD, FRS, &c.’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, p. 11). Jekyll’s degrees indicate that he
studied civil law at the university level and is entitled to practice as an advocate. The
Doctor of Civil Law degree was abbreviated D.C.L. at Oxford and LL.D. at Cambridge
(see J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3d ed. [London: Butterworths,
1990], pp. 193–94). Civil law countries such as France and Germany, as we have seen,
recognized the idea of irresistible impulse. Although alienists distinguished between
moral and impulsive insanity, the two forms of insanity overlapped in practice, as
defense arguments for irresistible impulse merged into general claims about offenders’
emotional and volitional impairment (see Smith, Trial by Medicine, p. 114). Jekyll
likewise blurs the distinctions between these disorders when he crafts his defense.
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him to break into Jekyll’s cabinet to obtain certain chemicals
locked therein, Dr. Lanyon feels certain that his colleague is
‘‘insane’’ (p. 49). ‘‘The more I reflected,’’ he explains to Utterson,
‘‘the more convinced I grew that I was dealing with a case of
cerebral disease’’ (p. 51). When Jekyll goes to Dr. Lanyon’s house
to obtain the mixture, the doctor describes him as ‘‘wrestling
against the approaches of the hysteria’’ (p. 52).
There is other evidence, too, suggesting that Jekyll suffers
from disordered emotional and volitional faculties. Jekyll, ‘‘the
very pink of the proprieties, celebrated too’’ (Jekyll and Hyde,
p. 9), shows an inexplicable delight in committing violent
acts—a sign, according to Prichard and Maudsley, of moral
insanity. Jekyll experiences a profound change in character
when his ‘‘lower elements’’ (p. 57) take control of his will, again
in accordance with Prichard’s and Maudsley’s accounts of the
disease. During these periods, it is as if Jekyll becomes a different
person—an utter ‘‘stranger’’ (p. 58). In his ‘‘second and worse
[self]’’ he has—as Maudsley put it—‘‘no capacity of true moral
feeling; all his impulses and desires, to which he yields without
check, are egoistic; his conduct appears to be governed by
immoral motives’’ (Responsibility, p. 172). Indeed, Jekyll then
engages in acts that show a complete ‘‘moral insensibility and
insensate readiness to evil’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, p. 64)—exactly the
reverse of his normal behavior. As critics have noted, the deterioration of Jekyll’s mind is reflected in the transformation of
his body, in accordance with evolutionist thought.59 Utterson
recoils in horror when he meets the doctor’s evil double, for
Hyde has a ‘‘dwarfish’’ stature, ‘‘a displeasing smile,’’ and ‘‘a
savage laugh’’ (pp. 16, 15). Hyde’s voice, too, is ‘‘husky, whispering and somewhat broken’’ (p. 16); overall, he conveys a ‘‘haunting sense of unexpressed deformity’’ (p. 25). To Utterson, Hyde
‘‘seems hardly human’’ (p. 16). Poole refers to Hyde as a ‘‘thing’’
(pp. 39, 41)—a ‘‘masked thing like a monkey’’ (p. 42). Jekyll,
too, alludes to ‘‘the animal’’ and ‘‘brute that [sleeps] within’’ (pp.
66, 68). Through the vicious behavior and shocking demeanor
59

On Stevenson’s portrait of Hyde’s atavism, see Arata, Fictions of Loss, pp. 33–53;
Mighall, Geography, pp. 145–53, 187–95; Reid, Robert Louis Stevenson, pp. 92–105; Block,
‘‘James Sully’’; Mighall, ‘‘Diagnosing Jekyll’’; Persak, ‘‘Spencer’s Doctrines’’; and Tropp,
‘‘Schopenhauer,’’ pp. 144–47.
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of Jekyll’s alter ego, Stevenson presents Jekyll as a victim of
hereditary disease. The beast that sleeps within, Stevenson suggests, is a throwback to an earlier era of human development;
Jekyll has little control over—and thus little responsibility for—
the savage acts that he commits.
The spontaneous transformations that Jekyll experiences
further evoke his powerlessness in the face of mental disease.
At first, indulging in vice is a conscious choice; Jekyll decides
when and where to satisfy his sadistic appetite. Over time, however, he loses control of his impulses when he least expects and
wishes to do so. Two months before he murders Carew, for
example, he goes to sleep as Jekyll and awakens as Hyde. The
nocturnal setting suggests the role that his unconscious desires
play in this transformation. Dr. Lanyon later comes to Jekyll’s
rescue when Jekyll unexpectedly turns into his evil double; the
scientist, as we have seen, brings Jekyll the drug that restores
him to his ‘‘original and better self’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, p. 62). But
by the end of the novel, Jekyll can no longer maintain this
identity. If he sleeps or even dozes for a moment, he turns into
Hyde. At this point, his impulses have become truly irresistible.
Neither the weight of his conscience nor his ‘‘terrors of the
scaffold’’ (p. 65) has any effect on his behavior. The changes
to his body and character and the loss of his self-control accord
with Prichard’s and Maudsley’s accounts. Jekyll’s physical and
moral deterioration seem neatly to track the progress of emotional and volitional disease, thereby excusing him for Carew’s
murder.
The novel, however, refuses to accept this defense. Far
from weakening the idea of individual responsibility, the text
holds Jekyll fully accountable for his actions. Like Carpenter
and Bramwell in his day and Michael Gazzaniga and Stephen
Morse in our own, Stevenson affirms the existence of free will in
spite of biological and environmental influences on human
behavior. To broaden the scope of insanity, Stevenson shows,
is to blur the distinctions between deviance and disease, making it easy for educated, respected men like Jekyll to evade
responsibility for murder. The problem with acquitting Jekyll
on the ground of moral or impulsive insanity, Stevenson shows,
is that he exercises control over his actions until late in the text.
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Although the novel suggests that Jekyll’s evil impulses are, to
some extent, inherited and innate, it emphasizes that Jekyll
makes a conscious choice to embrace this inheritance.60 His
agency is evident in his account of his initial transformation:
There was something strange in my sensations, something indescribably new and, from its very novelty, incredibly sweet. I felt
younger, lighter, happier in body; within I was conscious of
a heady recklessness, a current of disordered sensual images
running like a mill race in my fancy, a solution of the bonds of
obligation, an unknown but not an innocent freedom of the
soul. I knew myself, at the first breath of this new life, to be more
wicked, tenfold more wicked, sold a slave to my original evil; and
the thought, in that moment, braced and delighted me like wine.
(Jekyll and Hyde, p. 57)

As Jekyll readily admits, he is thrilled by the changes that he
experiences. He feels not only ‘‘younger’’ but ‘‘happier,’’ elated
by his newfound freedom (p. 57). Hitherto, his life has been
one of ‘‘effort, virtue and control’’ (p. 58); now he is released
from all social constraints. Jekyll knows what he is doing: he
takes and furnishes a second residence in Soho, making his
‘‘preparations with the most studious care’’ (p. 59); he announces to his servants that Hyde will have ‘‘full liberty and
power about [his] house in the square’’ (p. 59); and he draws
up a will, leaving his fortune to his alter ego. The document
marks the voluntary relinquishing of his self-control; through
this instrument, he attempts to give free rein and legal sanction
to his violent impulses. Thus ‘‘fortified,’’ he ‘‘[begins] to profit
by the strange immunities of [his] position’’ (pp. 59–60). He
has no incentive to rein in his desires because he believes that
he is free—legally, if not morally—from the consequences of
his actions:
60
Most critics emphasize Stevenson’s alignment with—rather than resistance to—
the evolutionist psychology of his day. Reid stands apart in arguing that the novel
‘‘question[s] the power of heredity’’ even as it draws upon degenerationist thought
(Robert Louis Stevenson, p. 97). In her reading, though, Stevenson shows that degeneration stems not so much from ‘‘biological inheritance’’ as ‘‘from the denial of savage
instincts’’ (p. 11). Stevenson, she maintains, explains devolution in terms of environmental influence—in particular, overcivilization (pp. 97–98).
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Think of it—I did not even exist! Let me but escape into my
laboratory door, give me but a second or two to mix and swallow
the draught that I had always standing ready; and whatever he
had done, Edward Hyde would pass away like the stain of breath
upon a mirror; and there in his stead, quietly at home, trimming
the midnight lamp in his study, a man who could afford to laugh
at suspicion, would be Henry Jekyll. (p. 60)

Jekyll here expresses a fantasy of freedom—a desire to make
the responsible agent simply disappear. He admits that he
‘‘stood at times aghast before the acts of Edward Hyde’’ but
insists that ‘‘the situation was apart from ordinary laws, and insidiously relaxed the grasp of conscience’’ (p. 60). ‘‘It was Hyde,
after all, and Hyde alone,’’ he explains, ‘‘that was guilty. Jekyll was
no worse; he woke again to his good qualities seemingly unimpaired’’ (p. 60). Even as Jekyll acknowledges the failure of his
efforts, he attempts to conceal his culpability, manipulating language and law to serve his ends. The novel suggests that to
excuse Jekyll’s violence by deeming it ‘‘irresistible’’ is to allow
calculating criminals to elude responsibility for their actions.
A broad definition of insanity, the novel shows, encourages offenders to indulge, rather than to suppress, their illicit desires.
The analogy between insanity and intoxication that Jekyll
introduces reinforces this point. ‘‘I do not suppose,’’ Jekyll observes before relating his brutal murder, ‘‘that, when a drunkard
reasons with himself upon his vice, he is once out of five hundred times affected by the dangers that he runs through his
brutish, physical insensibility’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, pp. 63–64).
‘‘Neither had I,’’ he continues, ‘‘long as I had considered my
position, made enough allowance for the complete moral
insensibility and insensate readiness to evil, which were the
leading characters of Edward Hyde’’ (p. 64). Taking their cue
from such statements, critics have read the novel as a meditation on addiction and a contribution to the Victorian alcohol
debate.61 Jekyll’s references to drink, though, also shed light on
61
See Thomas L. Reed, Jr., The Transforming Draught: ‘‘Jekyll and Hyde,’’ Robert Louis
Stevenson and the Victorian Alcohol Debate (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Co., 2006);
Susan Zieger, Inventing the Addict: Drugs, Race, and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century British
and American Literature (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 2008), pp. 155–95;
Susan Heseltine Jagoda, ‘‘A Psychiatric Interpretation of Dr. Jekyll’s ‘Case,’’’ Victorian
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the controversy over insanity. The discourses of insanity and
intoxication overlapped in this period, as many doctors believed
that these conditions both resulted from a diseased will. In
Inebriety: Its Etiology, Pathology, Treatment and Jurisprudence
(1882), for example, the physician Norman Kerr observed that
‘‘men and women of the highest culture, the purest life, the
most exalted aims, have become reckless drunkards.’’62 They
did so, he maintained, ‘‘not from a determination to become
drunken . . . [or] any innate love of the inebriating agent, but
from a want of power to resist the overwhelming weight of
a well-nigh irresistible impulse within them, which, especially
when awakened to action on the contact of a narcotic with the
nervous system, hurled them away in spite of their vain efforts
at escape in a whirlwind of excessive indulgence’’ (Inebriety,
p. 4). In this protracted account, Kerr syntactically strips drunkards of agency, evoking the plight of those who succumb to
alcohol’s allure. In Kerr’s view, inebriety was not a choice but
a disease whose ‘‘nearest ally [was] ‘insanity’’’ (p. 14); the physical basis of the disease, he argued, had serious implications for
criminal law.63 Maudsley likewise conflated the conditions, explaining that the ‘‘great exaltation of ideas and feelings and
will’’ that resulted from the deterioration of the moral sense
was like that experienced in the early stages of alcoholic intoxication. In his view, the physical basis of intoxication illuminated ‘‘the physical nature of the initial process of a moral
derangement’’ (Body and Will, p. 267). For Maudsley, as for
Kerr, the connection went further, too: Maudsley claimed that
intemperance was itself a chief cause of insanity, and, as we
have seen, he insisted that those who suffered from such illness
-

Newsletter, no. 89 (1996), 31–33; and Daniel L. Wright, ‘‘‘The Prisonhouse of My
Disposition’: A Study of the Psychology of Addiction in Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,’’ Studies
in the Novel, 26 (1994), 254–67. Zieger reads the diseased will as a metaphor for both
alcohol addiction and homosexuality; the two discourses, she notes, were linked in the
world outside the novel.
62
Norman Kerr, Inebriety: Its Etiology, Pathology, Treatment and Jurisprudence, 2d ed.
(London: H. K. Lewis, 1889), p. 4.
63
In many cases, Kerr argued, intoxicated individuals ought to be exempt from
criminal responsibility; in others, they ought to receive a reduction in punishment (see
Inebriety, pp. 390–417). In his view, cases involving ‘‘the inebriety of insanity’’ and ‘‘the
insanity of inebriety’’ both warranted complete exemptions (p. 400).
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deserved compassion and care instead of blame and punishment.64 Jurists, however, viewed intoxication in a different
light. Then, as today, courts were reluctant to excuse individuals
who committed crimes while voluntarily inebriated. Judges
deemed such individuals culpable for getting drunk in the first
place.65 Carpenter, as we have seen, endorsed this idea. The
criminal who acted from an overpowering impulse was, in Carpenter’s view, ‘‘remotely responsible (like the drunkard . . . ),
because he . . . allowed himself to become thus possessed, when
the means of escape lay in his own power’’ (Principles, p. 672).66
In Jekyll and Hyde, Stevenson affirms this approach. Much as
Carpenter does, Stevenson presents addiction to vice as a habit
that can—and should—be controlled. After Jekyll unexpectedly wakes up in the body of Hyde, he admits: ‘‘I began to
spy a danger that, if this were much prolonged, the balance
of my nature might be permanently overthrown, the power of
voluntary change [might] be forfeited, and the character of
Edward Hyde [might] become irrevocably mine’’ (Jekyll and
Hyde, p. 62). But, even as he bids ‘‘a resolute farewell to the
liberty, the comparative youth, the light step, leaping pulses and
secret pleasures, that [he] . . . enjoy[s] in the disguise of Hyde’’
(p. 63), he neither gives up his house in Soho nor destroys
Hyde’s clothes. His vivid description of these pleasures suggests
that he is not, in fact, willing to let go of them. As Jekyll explains,
using a tellingly passive formulation, ‘‘I chose the better part and
was found wanting in the strength to keep to it’’ (p. 63). When
Jekyll brutally beats Carew to death two months later, he still has
64

On intemperance as a cause of insanity, see Maudsley, Body and Mind, pp. 67–68;
Maudsley, Body and Will, pp. 273–75; and Maudsley, Responsibility, pp. 43, 283–87.
65
See K.J.M. Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists: Developments in English Criminal
Jurisprudence 1800–1957 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 100–102, 239–45;
and Walker, Crime and Insanity, I, 177–81. The courts did accept the idea that alcoholism could give rise to involuntary intoxication, and they permitted evidence of a defendant’s intoxicated condition to be used to establish other defenses (see Smith, Lawyers,
pp. 101–2, 240–41). Today, some states permit evidence of voluntary intoxication to
negate the mens rea requirement for ‘‘specific intent’’ crimes. But the principle is
controversial and some states have begun to narrow or abolish it (see Cases and Materials
on Criminal Law, ed. Joshua Dressler and Stephen P. Garvey, 6th ed. [St. Paul: Thomson
Reuters, 2012], pp. 587–89).
66
On the analogy between insanity and intoxication, see also W. B. Carpenter,
‘‘The Physiology of the Will,’’ Contemporary Review, 17 (1871), 215–16.
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control over his impulses. (Only later does he find himself
repeatedly and unexpectedly turning into Hyde.) After leading
an upright and quiet life for a time, Jekyll becomes ‘‘tortured with
throes and longings, as of Hyde struggling after freedom; and at
last, in an hour of moral weakness,’’ he again indulges his longings
(p. 63). He is susceptible to these feelings because, as he acknowledges, he has ‘‘voluntarily stripped [him]self of all those balancing instincts, by which even the worst of us continues to walk
with some degree of steadiness among temptations’’ (p. 64). It is
difficult but still possible for him to resist his illicit desires at this
point. Jekyll is responsible, the novel shows, for failing to bring
his addiction under control before it is too late.
The law does, in fact, deter Jekyll from indulging his desires at several points in the text. After he kills Carew, Jekyll’s
impulses are checked for a time by his ‘‘terrors of the scaffold’’;
‘‘had it not been for his fear of death,’’ Jekyll later observes,
‘‘[Hyde] would long ago have ruined himself in order to
involve me in the ruin’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, pp. 65, 69). Several
months after the murder, Jekyll unexpectedly turns into Hyde
while sitting on a bench in the park. Angry and desperate, Hyde
‘‘lust[s] to inflict pain’’; even then, though, he manages to
‘‘[master] his fury with a great effort of the will’’ (p. 67). As
Lanyon reports, when Hyde arrives at Lanyon’s house to obtain
the drug later that night, a policeman standing nearby ‘‘advanc[es] with his bull’s eye open’’ (p. 51). ‘‘At the sight,’’ Lanyon
explains, ‘‘I thought my visitor started and made greater haste’’
(p. 51). These reactions reveal that Jekyll is capable of reining in
his violent desires when he wishes to do so. Like Bramwell in his
day and Gazzaniga in our own, Stevenson shows that the idea of
irresistible impulse provides a ready excuse for criminals who are
able—but unwilling—to control their actions.
The motif of role-play that runs through the text further
underscores Jekyll’s responsibility for Carew’s murder. In his
statement, Jekyll likens his transformations to that of an actor
who dons a ‘‘disguise’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, pp. 60, 63). ‘‘When
I wore the semblance of Edward Hyde,’’ he relates, ‘‘none could
come near to me at first without a visible misgiving of the flesh’’
(p. 58). He is nonetheless attracted to this role, eager to escape
‘‘the dryness of a life of study’’ (p. 59). ‘‘I had but to . . . doff at
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once the body of the noted professor,’’ he explains, ‘‘and to
assume, like a thick cloak, that of Edward Hyde’’ (p. 59). Later
on, he again describes himself as being ‘‘in [his] second character’’ (p. 66) when he assumes the identity of his ‘‘worse [self]’’
(p. 62). And, until late in the novel, his transformations all take
place in a ‘‘cabinet’’ located above an old ‘‘anatomical theatre’’
that functions as Jekyll’s laboratory (p. 62; see also p. 47).
Through the motif of the mad doctor as actor, Stevenson emphasizes the voluntary nature of the changes that Jekyll experiences. The theatrical imagery undercuts the idea that his
crimes are biologically determined; Stevenson suggests that
Jekyll’s behavior is the effect of design rather than disease.
The metaphor of the actor, like that of the alcoholic, moreover, underscores the loss of freedom that results from repeatedly indulging in vice. Jekyll’s life becomes incoherent when he
attempts to maintain ‘‘two characters as well as two appearances’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, p. 59). By the end of the text, it is ‘‘only
under the immediate stimulation of the drug that [he is] able
to wear the countenance of Jekyll’’ (p. 68). Stevenson uses the
theatrical metaphor to show the dangers of repeatedly assuming a deviant disguise: over time, Jekyll loses his ‘‘original and
better self’’ in the part that he plays.67 Utterson, of course, goes
to the other extreme: he shuns all role-play; though he ‘‘enjoy[s]
the theatre, [he has] not crossed the doors of one for twenty
years’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, p. 5). The problem, Stevenson shows, is
that Jekyll does not feed his appetite in moderation; rather, he
repeatedly indulges his passions until he utterly confounds the
distinctions between his nighttime fantasies and his waking
67
Stevenson is drawing here on a well-known critique of the theater. Anxieties
about self-estrangement and self-forgetting, as David Marshall shows, underlie JeanJacques Rousseau’s influential account of actors and acting in Letter to M. d’Alembert on
the Theatre (1758) (see Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d’Alembert on the Theatre,
trans. Allan Bloom [Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1968], pp. 79–81; and Marshall,
‘‘Rousseau and the State of Theater,’’ Representations, no. 13 [1986], 90–92). Stevenson
was himself attracted to the theater. In 1872, he took part in a number of amateur
theatricals; in 1875, he played Duke Orsino in a performance of Twelfth Night; and two
years later, he acted in a play based on Masks and Faces by Charles Reade (see Hammond, Chronology, pp. 9, 17, 21). Between 1880 and 1885, he also cowrote four plays
and planned several others (see Hammond, Chronology, pp. 25, 29, 37, 43, 45; and
Stevenson, Plays). As an avid actor and playwright, Stevenson would have been keenly
aware of the possibilities and dangers of theatricality and disguise.
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actions. Through the metaphor of the theater, Stevenson emphasizes Jekyll’s responsibility for Carew’s murder, while demonstrating the need to regulate one’s passions before it is too late.
The defense of emotional insanity, the novel shows, is ultimately founded on little more than a desire to avoid responsibility for one’s actions. As we have seen, after Jekyll attacks
Carew, he insists that ‘‘no man morally sane could have been
guilty of that crime upon so pitiful a provocation’’ (Jekyll and
Hyde, p. 64). He suggests, in short, that it is not possible for him
to have been sane at the time because he committed such an
appalling and inexplicable act. Following Prichard and Maudsley, Jekyll uses his supposed insanity to excuse his crime—but
the crime itself provides the evidence of his insanity. At other
points, he refers to his ‘‘moral weakness’’ (p. 63) and ‘‘moral
insensibility’’ (p. 64) but offers no proof of his madness other
than the vicious and seemingly uncontrollable nature of his
acts. His circular reasoning undermines his defense, undoing
the association between his inner beast and mental disease.
The novel likewise undermines the diagnoses offered by
Jekyll’s friends and acquaintances. Much as Jekyll does, they
conflate ‘‘madness’’ with behavior that is disagreeable, shocking, and strange. As we have seen, Utterson—‘‘a lover of the
sane and customary sides of life’’—thinks that it is ‘‘madness’’
for Jekyll to change his will to leave his property to Hyde (Jekyll
and Hyde, p. 11). When Hyde disappears following Carew’s
murder, Utterson asks Jekyll, ‘‘You have not been mad enough
to hide this fellow?’’ (p. 26). Dr. Lanyon’s own charges of
Jekyll’s mental instability stem from a disagreement about
science; Lanyon cannot understand how a man of Jekyll’s stature could reject the views of the scientific establishment.
Through these careless diagnoses, Stevenson shows how easy
it is to elide the distinctions between illness and vice.68 Far from
signaling mental disease, ‘‘madness’’ becomes synonymous with
68

Rosner similarly observes that Jekyll’s ‘‘self-serving diagnosis is undercut by the
excess of references to insanity in the novel’’ (‘‘Total Subversion,’’ p. 30). In her view,
‘‘almost everyone is seen as ‘insane’ in one way or another—suggesting perhaps that
insanity may be a norm in the world of the novel or that medical terms like insanity may
be almost meaningless’’ (p. 30). Jekyll, though, is the only one who is described as
insane; madness is hardly a norm in the world of the text.
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folly, stupidity, and eccentricity. The woman who witnesses
Carew’s murder likewise invokes the idea of insanity when she
describes the attack. (Hyde, she reports, was ‘‘carrying on . . .
like a madman.’’) And Utterson’s clerk, Mr. Guest, as we have
seen, instinctively quips that ‘‘the man, of course, was mad.’’
These verdicts are no more substantiated than are Utterson’s
and Lanyon’s judgments, but the young woman and the clerk
display a similar assurance about them. For nothing seems
more shocking and strange, in the world of respectable Victorian society, than a vicious attack on an elderly M.P. Through
these instinctive responses to Carew’s brutal murder, Stevenson
shows the danger of conflating criminality and madness, while
contesting the growing distortion of the idea of insanity in
Victorian culture.
The novel ultimately substitutes the language of moral and
legal judgment for that of illness, reaffirming the distinctions
between deviance and disease. Jekyll repeatedly refers to
Hyde’s evil nature, emphasizing his ‘‘wicked[ness],’’ ‘‘cruelty,’’
and ‘‘infamy’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, pp. 57, 58, 59, 60). Invoking
a theological understanding of crime as sin, Jekyll likens Hyde
to Satan, denouncing his evil double as a ‘‘child of Hell’’ (p. 67).
Although Jekyll attempts to distance himself from his alter ego
(‘‘He, I say—I cannot say I,’’ the doctor famously insists [p. 67]),
the novel undermines his efforts, highlighting his guilt, shame,
and ‘‘remorse’’ (pp. 64, 65). Indeed, the specter of legal punishment looms large in his consciousness. After beating Carew to
death, he declares that he ‘‘was glad to have [his] better impulses
thus buttressed and guarded by the terrors of the scaffold’’
(p. 65). Later, he alludes to Hyde’s ‘‘terror of the gallows,’’ which
drives Hyde ‘‘continually to commit temporary suicide, and return to his subordinate station of a part instead of a person’’
(p. 69). Although here again Jekyll attempts to separate his
‘‘original and better self’’ from his evil double, the novel shows
that they are one and the same. Through the language of guilt
and the specter of the scaffold, Stevenson presents Jekyll as a villain rather than a victim, a criminal who needs punishing rather
than a patient who deserves treatment and care.
In the end, the novel metes out its own justice. Jekyll is
‘‘punished,’’ as he observes, by Hyde’s ‘‘moral insensibility and
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insensate readiness to evil’’ (Jekyll and Hyde, p. 64). After the
murder, he becomes a ‘‘prisoner’’ in his own house (p. 35). ‘‘I
have brought on myself a punishment and a danger that I cannot name,’’ he cryptically explains to Utterson: ‘‘If I am the
chief of sinners, I am the chief of sufferers also. I could not
think that this earth contained a place for sufferings and terrors
so unmanning’’ (p. 33). Later on, after he loses control of his
impulses, he becomes ‘‘a creature eaten up and emptied by
fever, languidly weak both in body and mind, and solely occupied by one thought: the horror of [his] other self’’ (p. 68).
When Utterson and Poole eventually discover Jekyll’s dead
body, Poole declares that they have come ‘‘too late . . . [either]
to save or punish’’ (p. 45). Jekyll, though, does not need the
legal authorities to discipline him; his loss of willpower is itself
an unbearable torture. Previously, he sought to escape ‘‘the prisonhouse of [his] disposition’’ (p. 59); now he becomes a prisoner in his own body. He paces back and forth in the cabinet
over the laboratory, weeping and wringing his hands, locked in
a cell of his own making. Before Utterson can break down the
door, of course, Jekyll takes his own life. His suicide may be an
act of cowardice—an attempt to avoid legal punishment—or an
acknowledgment of guilt. But while Jekyll avoids the gallows, he
does not escape death; although he eludes a formal indictment,
he does not escape moral judgment.69 Stevenson technically
gives Jekyll the last word, but he undermines Jekyll’s defense at
69
Most critics overlook the closure that Stevenson provides. For Hirsch, the ‘‘psychological focus and epistemological skepticism of the gothic deconstructs the detective genre as Stevenson explores it’’; the text ‘‘ends in puns and ambiguities—its
mysteries (dis)solved’’ (‘‘Frankenstein, Detective Fiction, and Jekyll and Hyde,’’ pp. 241,
242). For Peter K. Garrett, ‘‘the tale’s greatest power and interest derive less from any
high philosophic intention we may ascribe to it than from its fictional irresponsibility,
its refusal or failure to offer any secure position for its reader or to establish any fixed
relation between its voices’’ (Garrett, ‘‘Cries and Voices: Reading Jekyll and Hyde,’’ in
‘‘Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’’ after One Hundred Years, p. 70). John R. Reed, too, contends that
‘‘the issue of freedom is left unresolved as the story ends with the posthumous voice of
Henry Jekyll’’ (Victorian Will, p. 389). Persak likewise claims that the novel ‘‘fails to
provide a moral resolution by having either Utterson or the omniscient ‘narrator’ place
into perspective Jekyll’s moral dilemma, his experiment, and his death’’ (‘‘Spencer’s
Doctrines,’’ p. 17). Carol Margaret Davison, by contrast, argues that Stevenson shows
Utterson to be the true criminal; the lawyer is responsible for Jekyll’s death, she claims,
because he knows that when he breaks down the door, Jekyll will commit suicide (see
Davison, ‘‘A Battle of Wills: Solving The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde,’’ in Troubled
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every turn. The inclusion of Jekyll’s posthumous statement itself
underscores the futility of his efforts: Stevenson appends the
doctor’s remarks to a case that is—for all intents and purposes—already closed. Much as D. A. Miller argues of classic
detective fiction, Stevenson’s novel becomes an agent of discipline, a substitute for the police.70 Criminals like Jekyll routinely
escaped justice in the world outside the novel, but in Stevenson’s
hands, Jekyll’s violent impulses work finally to punish rather
than to excuse the offender. Contesting the use of emotional
insanity to acquit educated professionals like Jekyll, Stevenson
holds the respected doctor guilty of murder.
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